Diversity Jurisdiction for Limited Liability Corporations and Partnerships

Defendants in business disputes often wish to have their cases heard in federal rather than state court.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are standardized and may be more streamlined than their state-law counterparts.  Furthermore, Plaintiffs in federal civil cases must obtain a unanimous verdict, whereas many states simply require a majority or supermajority.  There also is a prevailing perception that the federal bench is more likely to grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment, though it is less pronounced in jurisdictions like California, which have specialized complex litigation courts that themselves are sometimes more receptive to such motions.  

Regardless of the reason for knocking, the gates of federal court are not open to all comers.  Where federal question jurisdiction is lacking, parties must navigate the corridors of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  The requirements are well known; the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000 and there must be complete diversity of citizenship between all plaintiffs and defendants.  But determining whether diversity exists in cases featuring limited liability corporations and partnerships presents unique complications:  

  1. Courts Consider the Residency of All Members or Partners:   While the general rule for corporations is that they are citizens of the state in which they are incorporated, the Supreme Court has erected a “doctrinal wall,” whereby this rule does not apply to other types of entities.  See, e.g., Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 189 (1990).  For unincorporated entities, diversity jurisdiction depends on the citizenship of “all the members.”  Id.  It does not matter if certain members are general or limited partners or hold greater or lesser rights.  All of their citizenships are considered.  

  2. Courts May Trace Through Multiple Entity Levels:  A court’s diversity analysis is not superficial – if one member of an LLC is itself an LLC or partnership, then the members or partners of that entity must also be considered.  See, e.g., Mut. Assignment & Indem. Co. v. Lind-Waldock & Co., LLC, 364 F.3d 858, 861 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Lind-Waldock is a limited liability company, which means that it is a citizen of every state of which any member is a citizen; this may need to be traced through multiple levels if any of its members is itself a partnership or LLC.”).

  3. Courts Split on Pleading Requirements and Jurisdictional Discovery:  A party seeking to invoke diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of pleading facts that demonstrate diversity exists.  Therefore, to properly allege diversity against an LLC or partnership, one must allege the citizenship of each of its members.  However, that information may not be publicly available, because most states do not require the identity and citizenship of partners or members of an unincorporated entity to be publicly disclosed.  This conundrum has led to divergent rulings on several related issues: 

    • Cases are currently split on whether a party invoking diversity jurisdiction may (1) allege the citizenship of an LLC or partnership based on information and belief, or (2) seek jurisdictional discovery into that issue in federal court.  See, e.g., Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2015) (proper to plead citizenship on information and belief and seek jurisdictional discovery); Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure § 1224 (3d ed. 2013) (pleading on the basis of information and belief “is a practical necessity.”); but see, e.g., MCP Trucking, LLC v. Speedy Heavy Hauling, Inc., 2014 WL 5002116 (D. Colo. Oct. 6, 2014) (denying jurisdictional discovery and remanding to state court while noting that further discovery in state court could demonstrate that diversity exists); Lake v. Hezebicks, 2014 WL 1874853 (N.D. Ind. May 9, 2014) (collecting cases).

    • Furthermore, there is a circuit split concerning whether negative statements of citizenship, i.e. a bare allegation that the counter-party is not a citizen of the plaintiff’s state of citizenship, are sufficient.  Compare Lewis v. Rego, Co., 757 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1985) (negative citizenship pleading is sufficient) with D.B. Zwirn Special Opportunities Fund, LP v. Mehrotra, 661 F.3d 124 (1st Cir. 2011) (negative citizenship pleading is not sufficient).  

    • Note, some of these issues may be obviated due to recent amendments to FRCP 7.1, which now requires parties in an action in which federal court jurisdiction is based on diversity to file a disclosure statement “naming or identifying the citizenship of every individual or entity whose citizenship is attributed to that party or intervenor.”  

For more information regarding Alto Litigation’s litigation practice, please contact one of Alto Litigation’s partners: Bahram Seyedin-Noor, Bryan Ketroser, or Joshua Korr.

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Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.

California’s Unjust Treatment of Unjust Enrichment

With ancient roots, the unjust enrichment claim has long allowed recovery for money paid by mistake or when contract formation fails.  Indeed, the Roman jurist Pomponious once dictated the operating principle behind unjust enrichment: “This by nature is equitable, that no one be made richer through another’s loss.”  John P. Dawson, Unjust Enrichment: A Comparative Analysis at 42-63 (1951).  Withstanding the test of time, unjust enrichment became enshrined in the English common law in 1760, when Lord Mansfield said, “this kind of equitable action, to recover back money, which ought not in justice to be kept, is very beneficial, and therefore much encouraged.” (1760) 2 Bur 1005.  And our legal system has largely followed suit.  As summarized by the America Law Institute, “a person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in restitution.” Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 1 cmt. B (2011).

Despite this august history, the unjust enrichment claim has not found eternal acceptance in California courts.  To the contrary, a recent published decision has flatly stated: “California does not recognize a cause of action for unjust enrichment.”  Hooked Media Grp., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 55 Cal. App. 5th 323, 336 (2020).  According to this strain of caselaw, the phrase “‘unjust enrichment’ does not describe a theory of recovery, but an effect: the result of a failure to make restitution under circumstances where it is equitable to do so.”  Melchior v. New Line Prods., Inc., 106 Cal. App. 4th 779, 793, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 347, 357 (2003).  In other words, a party may recover for unjust enrichment only if it establishes an independent—and inevitably narrower—legal claim, such as quasi-contract.  See id; Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey, 223 Cal. App. 4th 221, 231, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 872 (2014) (construing unjust enrichment claim as “a quasi-contract claim seeking restitution”).  Pleading unjust enrichment alone may not suffice.  Id.    

To be sure, California’s disdain for the unjust enrichment claim is not universal; some caselaw does approve of it.  For example, an unjust enrichment claim was upheld as enforceable in Elder v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co., 205 Cal. App. 4th 841, 857 (2012).  The Elder plaintiff alleged that telephone public utilities overcharged him for unauthorized premium content charges.  Id. With the elements described simply as “receipt of a benefit and [the] unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another,” the unjust enrichment pleading survived demurrer.  Id.  

Elder does not stand alone; a laundry list of older California precedent respects the unjust enrichment claim as a viable one.  See, e.g., Peterson v. Cellco P’ship, 164 Cal. App. 4th 1583, 1593 (2008) (stating elements of unjust enrichment); Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 77 Cal. App. 4th 723, 726 (2000) (“Lectrodryer satisfied the elements for a claim of unjust enrichment: receipt of a benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another.”); Ghirardo v. Antonioli, 14 Cal. 4th 39, 50, 54 (1996) (party was entitled to “seek relief under traditional equitable principles of unjust enrichment”; claim for “payment of money” based on unjust enrichment theory was “adequately pleaded and proved”); First Nationwide Sav. v. Perry, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1657, 1662 (1992) (“[plaintiff’s] complaint can be amended to state a cause of action for unjust enrichment.”).

Despite the stubborn split of authority, the California Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on either restoring the unjust enrichment claim to its historical status or relegating it to the dustbin of history.  In the meantime, a wise plaintiff will plead at least one other theory, quasi-contract or otherwise, that is universally accepted under California law.

For more information regarding Alto Litigation’s litigation practice, please contact one of Alto Litigation’s partners: Bahram Seyedin-Noor, Bryan Ketroser, or Joshua Korr.

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Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.

Daily Journal Publishes Jared Kopel Article on Supreme Court Case that Could Relax the Barriers to Securities Suits

The Supreme Court will soon consider whether a direct listing on an exchange eliminates the need for a claim under the Securities Act of 1933 to prove that the plaintiff bought stock issued pursuant to the registration statement that allegedly contained misrepresentations. The case, Slack Technologies, LLC v. Pirani, is significant given that the Court’s decisions could relax the barriers to private securities lawsuits against companies going public.

Jared Kopel, a senior counsel at Alto Litigation, recently wrote an article in the Daily Journal breaking down what’s at stake and the key issues the Court will be considering in the Slack Technologies case. Click here to access the article (subscription required).

For more information regarding securities litigation, please contact one of Alto Litigation’s partners Bahram Seyedin-Noor, Bryan Ketroser or Joshua Korr, or senior counsel Jared Kopel.

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Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.

SEC’s Continued Focus on Insider Trading Plans: New Rulemaking and Enforcement Action

In the past week the SEC has demonstrated its continued focus on insider trading and Rule 10b5-1 trading plans under Chairman Gary Gensler’s watch.

First, the SEC’s December 2022 amendments to Rule 10b5-1 of the Securities Exchange Act took effect. These amendments increase the requirements on company insiders who adopt 10b5-1 trading plans in the following ways:

  • Mandatory Cooling Off Periods: The amendments require corporate officers or directors who enter into Rule 10b5-1 trading arrangements to observe a cooling-off period of up to 120 days before any trading may commence. The new amendments also mandate a cooling-off period of 30 days for trading arrangements for people other than issuers, directors or officers.

  • Good Faith Certification Re: Material Non-Public Information: Directors and managers adopting or modifying a 10b5-1 plan must now certify that they are not aware of any material nonpublic information about a company or its securities and that they are adopting the plan in good faith.

  • Prohibition on Overlapping Plans: The amendments restrict the use of multiple overlapping trading plans and limit the ability to rely on the affirmative defense for a single-trade plan to one single-trade plan per twelve-month period for all persons other than issuers.

  • Enhanced Disclosure Requirements: The amendments require more comprehensive disclosure about issuers’ policies and procedures related to insider trading, including quarterly disclosure regarding the use of Rule 10b5-1 plans; the timing of options grants and the release of material nonpublic information; and a requirement to report any option awards beginning four business days before the filing of a periodic report or a Form 8-K that discloses material nonpublic information. Furthermore, insiders that report on Forms 4 or 5 will be required to indicate that a reported transaction was intended to satisfy the affirmative defense conditions of Rule 10b5-1(c) and to disclose the date of adoption of the trading plan.

Second, the SEC announced an enforcement action for insider trading with respect to trades made pursuant to a 10b5-1 plan. The SEC brought this enforcement action against the Executive Chairman of Ontrak, a health care company based in Santa Monica, for selling more than $20 million in stock while he was aware of the company's deteriorating relationship with a major customer. The defendant, Terrence Peizer, allegedly sold his stock after he had entered into Rule 10b5-1 trading plans. The SEC alleged that Peizer entered into those plans while in possession of material nonpublic information. Parallel criminal charges also were brought against Peizer.

For more information regarding insider trading, and SEC-related issues in general, please contact one of Alto Litigation’s partners:  Bahram Seyedin-Noor, Bryan Ketroser, or Joshua Korr.

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Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.

SEC Cracks Down On Crypto

Gary Gensler, the chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission, keeps his promises, at least when it comes to cracking down on crypto trading.  And not everyone is happy about it.

In recent weeks, the SEC has:

  • Brought charges against Hall of Famer former NBA star Paul Pierce for touting EMAX tokens, a crypto asset offered and sold by Ethereum, on social media without disclosing that he received more than $244,000 in tokens for his promotional effort. The SEC also alleged that Pierce misrepresented the size of his personal holdings of the tokens. Without admitting or denying the allegations, Pierce agreed to pay a $1.115 million penalty and make approximately $240,000 in disgorgement.

  • Accused Singapore-based Terraform Labs PTE Ltd. and its CEO and majority stockholder, Do Hyeong Kwon, of a four-year scheme that raised billions of dollars from investors by selling various crypto assets that the SEC alleged were securities in fraudulent unregistered transactions that resulted in significant losses for U.S. investors. The complaint asserted, among other things, that defendants misled investors about the stability of Terraform’s algorithmic “stablecoin,” called Terra USD (UST), that purportedly was pegged to the value of the U.S. dollar. The SEC charged that UST’s value was propped only by billions of dollars from investors, and then that after cash disappeared, the value of UST and Terraform’s other crypto assets fell to zero.

  • Charged Payward Ventures, Inc. and Payward Trading Ltd., both commonly known as Kraken, with failing to register the offer and sale of their crypto asset staking-as-a-service program, whereby Kraken pooled crypto assets provided by investors and stakes them on behalf of investors. Staking involves locking up tokens in exchange for new tokens when the staked crypto becomes part of the process for validating data on a blockchain.  The SEC’s complaint filed in federal court in San Francisco alleged that although Kraken promised 21% annual investment returns, investors did not receive necessary disclosure, including disclosures surrounding the business and financial condition of defendants, fees, and the risk that investors might lose protection of their tokens.  The Kraken entities settled by agreeing to shut down the staking program and pay $30 million in disgorgement, prejudgment interest and penalties.  However, SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce, a longtime defender of crypto, objected to the enforcement action, arguing that staking services provide a benefit to investors.

  • Charged Genesis Global Capital and Gemini Trust Company (controlled by the Winkelvoss Brothers) with the unregistered offer and sale of securities through the Gemini Earn crypto asset lending program.

  • Brought settled charges against Nexo Capital, Inc. for failing to register the offer and sale of its retail crypto asset lending product, Earn Interest Product (EIP). Nexo agreed to halt the sale of EIP and pay a $22.5 million penalty, as well as pay an identical amount to settle state regulatory actions.

  • Voted 4-1 to amend federal custody requirements to include crypto assets, which would likely require crypto exchanges to obtain further regulatory approval. Commissioner Peirce again objected, opposing the rule because of its timing, workability and breadth.  But she also stated that she hoped to support a final rule after public comment and possible amendments. Commissioner Peirce was not alone in her criticism. The chief policy officer of the Blockchain Association, an industry group, accused the SEC of engaging in “regulation by enforcement.” And Coinbase’s CEO, Brian Armstrong, accused the SEC of “sketchy behavior” while Tyler Winkelvoss called the SEC’s charges against Genesis and Gemini as “totally counterproductive.” 

For more information regarding strategy involving interactions with the SEC, please contact one of Alto Litigation’s partners:  Bahram Seyedin-Noor, Bryan Ketroser, or Joshua Korr.

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Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.

Alto Litigation Attorneys Giving Back

Serving our community through pro bono work is part of Alto Litigation’s core values. In this season of giving, we are even more grateful for the opportunities to give back to the local community. 

In 2022, Alto attorney Monica Mucchetti Eno took on a pro bono engagement for a client of the Legal Aid Society of San Mateo. The Legal Aid Society is a vital voice for underserved populations that provides free, quality legal services to low-income residents in San Mateo County.

Legal Aid Society of San Mateo provides a myriad of legal services including domestic violence support, guardianship, housing clinics, conservatorship, and other needs as they arise. In her pro bono work, Ms. Eno represented the mother of an 18-year-old child with severe developmental and cognitive disabilities, to secure conservatorship over her son. 

As a result of Ms. Eno’s efforts, the client obtained a Court Order in August appointing her as her son’s limited conservator. As her son’s conservator, the client may now provide for her son’s needs associated with daily life, including making arrangements for his housing, health care, meals, personal care and education.

Five Reasons to Designate your Case as Complex in California Superior Court

Litigation is rarely simple, but there are complex cases, and then there are “complex cases.”  

A “complex case” is an action that requires exceptional judicial management to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on the Court or the litigants. The designation is intended to expedite the case, keep costs reasonable, and promote effective decision-making by the court, the parties, and counsel. California Rule of Court 3.400(b) sets forth five criteria for the court to consider in determining whether a case should be treated as complex. Those criteria are whether the action is likely to involve:

  1. Numerous pretrial motions raising difficult or novel legal issues that will be time-consuming to resolve;

  2. Management of a large number of witnesses or a substantial amount of documentary evidence;

  3. Management of a large number of separately represented parties;

  4. Coordination with related actions pending in one or more courts in other counties, states, or countries, or in a federal court; or

  5. Substantial post-judgment judicial supervision

While the court has the final say in whether a given case qualifies as complex, it likely will not undertake such an analysis unless prompted by one or both parties through a complex case designation (or counter-designation). 

Here are five reasons why you may want to consider designating your case as complex:

(1) Complex Cases are Assigned to Individual Judges

Unlike the typical case filed in California Superior Court, which may pass through multiple judicial hands, a complex case is assigned to the same judge for the entire life of the proceeding.  This will lead to a more educated judge, which in turn leads to better case management. 

This may be particularly important in a complicated securities or trade secrets dispute, where the Court’s ability to internalize new and unfamiliar fact patterns may prove essential to effective case management—and even resolution on the merits. With a single presiding judge, the parties will also benefit from tailoring their arguments to that judge’s preferences and past rulings, as expressed in both the current and past cases. 

Finally, complex case departments generally have a small number of complex judges. Indeed, San Francisco Superior Court has only two judges within the complex case department; Santa Clara Superior Court has only one judge. With this known universe of highly respected judicial officers, a party may readily predict which judicial officer will oversee its case before filing suit, leading to more predictable outcomes.  

(2) A Case Management Schedule Tailored to Your Client’s Needs.  

In a complex matter, a judge may depart from the California Rules of Court relating to pleadings, demurrers, ex parte applications, motions, discovery, provisional remedies, and the format of filings. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Super. Ct. 94 Cal. App. 4th 695, 704-05 (2001). 

This gives both the Court and the parties leeway to fashion a case schedule tailored to the needs of the case that are not necessarily called for by the default California rules. For example, parties often find it beneficial to include serial deadlines for completing document production, final interrogatory responses, fact depositions, requests for admissions, expert disclosures, expert depositions, dispositive motions, and the pre-trial order.  

A complex designation empowers the Court with the flexibility to impose and adjust these and other discovery deadlines as needed within the scheduling order to ensure an orderly resolution of the case.     

(3) Flexible Discovery Procedures

Many litigants also appreciate the more flexible discovery procedures typically offered in the complex setting. For example, the San Francisco Superior Court’s Complex Department automatically stays the deadline to file a motion to compel, normally required within 45 days of receiving a discovery response.  

This does away with the tedious practice of requiring the parties to stipulate to any such extensions, often inevitable in cases with voluminous document productions that neither side can realistically complete within the 45-day window.  

Complex courts also routinely adopt more informal mechanisms to resolve discovery (and sometimes non-discovery) disputes in lieu of formal motion practice.  

The San Francisco Complex Department offers another choice example. Eschewing formal motion practice, the parties are instructed to contact the Court to schedule an informal discovery conference when a dispute arises. The parties should provide a joint five-page letter outlining the nature of the discovery dispute.  

In our experience, this procedure is usually sufficient to resolve discovery disputes short of more costly and time-consuming motion practice. Given the number of discovery disputes that often arise in complex cases, we find these expedited procedures a superior alternative to resolving discovery disputes with the more burdensome formal briefing called for by the California Code of Civil Procedure.           

(4) Managing ESI Discovery

A judge assigned to a complex case is much more likely to have a solid foundation in managing discovery disputes involving large amounts of electronically-searchable information (“ESI”).  

Winning or losing your case may hinge on your ability to obtain the relevant evidence that may exist in these formats. At the same time, the sheer amount of data that may arguably be responsive to a facially reasonable discovery request may impose huge cost burdens on a responding party.  

This often becomes a fundamental pressure point in modern litigation, where the parties will need to negotiate the production of ESI from individual custodians, non-custodial resources, and instant messaging platforms.  

The parties are also often required to engage in the tedious but necessary process of iterating search terms. If a dispute arises, a steady judicial hand is essential to help the parties arrive at the correct balance between uncovering the relevant evidence while avoiding unreasonable discovery burdens.  

A complex judge is much more likely to have the required experience with the modern information technology platforms underlying these disputes.   

(5) Protective Orders

Another benefit of designating a case as complex relates to the relative ease of obtaining a robust protective order. These protective orders are often necessary in complex cases involving highly confidential information and trade secrets.  

The parties will benefit from working with an experienced jurist who is sensitive to the disclosure of confidential business matters. Many complex departments even offer model protective orders that include robust protections.  

For example, the Santa Clara County Complex Division offers a model protective order that allows for the protection of “trade secrets” and “confidential business or financial information[.]” This model protective order also includes specific procedures for filing confidential information under seal, an extremely useful standard for streamlining the sealing process that otherwise lacks clarity in the California Civil Procedure Code. 

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Please contact Alto Litigation partners Bahram Seyedin-Noor (bahram@altolit.com) or Bryan Ketroser (bryan@altolit.com) if you require counseling on a securities litigation matter.

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Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.



¹ https://www.scscourt.org/court_divisions/civil/complex/Model%20Confidentiality%20Order.pdf

Alto Litigation Partners Named Super Lawyers

Super Lawyers, a nationwide legal rating service, has included Alto Litigation Partners Bahram Seyedin-Noor and Bryan Kertroser on its 2022 list. Bahram Seyedin-Noor was recognized for his work in securities, business, and intellectual property litigation. Bryan Ketroser was recognized in securities and business litigation.

Only the top 5% of attorneys nominated are selected to the list, which Super Lawyers says is made up of “outstanding lawyers who have attained a high-degree of peer recognition and professional achievement.” Super Lawyers utilizes a patented, peer-influenced and research-driven selection process to determine its list each year, more information on the process is available here.

Super Lawyers notes that peer recognition is based on outstanding work, knowledge of the law, work ethic, and “commitment to the spirit of the legal profession.” Their selection for the 2022 list is Bryan’s third consecutive and Bahram’s eighth consecutive inclusion. 


Morgan v Sundance Part IV: Impact on State Courts

When a party is sued and has a right to move to compel arbitration, but delays and engages in the litigation process instead, there arises the question of whether, or at what point, the defending party has waived its right to arbitration.  In May 2022, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., where it held that under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), courts may not “condition a waiver of the right to arbitration on a showing of prejudice.”  Prior to Morgan, a majority of federal courts of appeal had required a showing of prejudice before finding arbitration waiver.  According to the Supreme Court that was erroneous because the federal policy “favoring arbitration” does not permit courts to “invent special, arbitration preferring procedural rules.”  Rather, it simply requires courts to place arbitration agreements “on the same footing as other contracts.”  Since “a federal court assessing waiver does not generally ask about prejudice,” the Court held it could not do so in the context of arbitration waiver either. 

As noted in Part III of Alto Litigation’s blog series on Morgan v. Sundance, courts have identified ambiguity in Morgan’s primary holding.  Specifically, it is not clear whether courts should continue to apply their unique arbitration waiver tests (shorn of any prejudice requirement) or simply apply their general test for waivers of all contractual rights.  While there often will not be “much daylight between those two tests,” the Southern District for New York concluded that in the Second Circuit at least, the two tests could lead to different results.  That conclusion led the court to perform two waiver analyses before rendering its ruling. 

But what should state courts do?  After all, Morgan was a federal holding regarding federal procedural rules.  However, because the FAA applies to lawsuits that involve interstate commerce, it preempts state laws that fail to place arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts.  Therefore, if state court litigation involves interstate commerce within the meaning of the FAA, then the court will have to apply Morgan.  If the litigation involves wholly intrastate issues, then Morgan will not be binding.  Thus, the first step for a state court is to evaluate whether the dispute is inter- or intra-state.  

If the dispute is truly interstate, then the state court must grapple with the impact of Morgan.  The biggest problem arises in states where prejudice is an integral component of the implied waiver analysis that applies to all contracts.  While Morgan was based on the premise that “a federal court assessing waiver does not generally ask about prejudice,” that is not true in all fifty states.  Thus, the second step, is to ascertain the jurisdiction’s test for arbitration waiver and compare it to the general test for waiver to see if there is meaningful daylight between them.  


For example, in Nevada, the test for implied waiver requires a showing of prejudice:  “In order to establish a waiver, the intention to waive must clearly appear, and the party relying upon the waiver must have been misled to his prejudice.”  If a Nevada court were to try to apply Morgan, it is faces something of a catch-22:  

  • If the court follows Morgan’s command to strip prejudice from the test, then the court would violate Morgan’s command to avoid bespoke procedural rules that treat arbitration agreements different from other agreements; 

  • If the court applies its general implied waiver rule, it would violate Morgan’s express holding that prejudice should not be part of the arbitration waiver analysis.  

While it is unclear how the ambiguity in Morgan should be resolved, it may not have much bearing on case outcomes, as explained in Part V of this blog series. 

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Please contact Alto Litigation partners Bahram Seyedin-Noor (bahram@altolit.com) or Bryan Ketroser (bryan@altolit.com) if you require counseling on a securities litigation matter.

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Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.


¹ Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 142 S.Ct. 1708, 1713 (2022)

² Id.

³ Id.

Id.

Herrera v. Manna 2nd Avenue LLC, 1:20-cv-11026-GHW, 2022 WL 2819072, at *7 (July 18, 2022) (internal citations omitted).

Id.

⁷ 9 U.S.C. § 1.

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).

Alto's Bahram Seyedin-Noor Contributes to Seminal Treatise on California Litigation

As the nature of business evolves, so does the law pertaining to business entity governance disputes. This week, LexisNexis released the latest edition of “Litigating and Judging California Business Entity Governance Disputes” – a seminal treatise that guides practitioners through a variety of complex business matters involving management, ownership and control of California corporations, LLCs, and general and limited partnerships.

Alto Litigation’s Bahram Seyedin-Noor is the author of Chapter 2 of “Litigating and Judging California Business Entity Governance Disputes,” covering disputes between and mong a corporation’s shareholders and its managers relating to the management of the corporation itself.  Alto partner Bryan Ketroser and partner-elect Joshua Korr also contributed to the chapter, which provides relevant citations to statutes and court decisions, together with insights, helpful tips and creative solutions for arbitrators, attorneys and judges, who are dealing with disputes regarding the management of a corporation.

Bahram Seyedin-Noor is the Founder and Managing Partner of Alto Litigation. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School and is admitted to practice in California before all federal district courts and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. He is a noted litigator in complex civil litigation, business litigation and counseling, SEC enforcement matters, and private securities. He is regularly recognized for his thoughtful strategy and adept litigation skills by The California Daily Journal, Benchmark Litigation, and Chambers USA.

For more information and to purchase the new edition visit LexisNexis.

Morgan v Sundance Part III: How to Apply Morgan's Holding

When a party is sued and has a right to move to compel arbitration, but delays and engages in the litigation process, there arises the question of whether, or at what point, the defending party has waived its right to arbitration.  In May 2022, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., where it held that under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), courts may not “condition a waiver of the right to arbitration on a showing of prejudice.”  Prior to Morgan, a majority of federal circuit courts had required a showing of prejudice before finding arbitration waiver.  According to the Supreme Court that was erroneous because the federal policy “favoring arbitration” does not permit courts to “invent special, arbitration preferring procedural rules.”  Rather, it simply requires courts to place arbitration agreements “on the same footing as other contracts.”  Since “a federal court assessing waiver does not generally ask about prejudice,” the Court held it could not do so in the context of arbitration waiver either. 

Sounds simple, but there is room for disagreement regarding how courts should interpret Morgan.  As the Southern District of New York recently recognized in Herrera v. Manna 2nd Avenue LLC:  

[T]he Supreme Court’s decision suggests that courts should toss out special rules for considering waivers of the right to arbitration, and instead use the same test for waiver as would be used in any other contractual dispute.  However, in its directions to the Eighth Circuit on remand, the Supreme Court commented that the Eighth Circuit could “strip” its test “of its prejudice requirement” and ask, “[d]id Sundance, as the rest of the Eighth Circuit’s test asks, knowingly relinquish the right to arbitrate by acting inconsistently with that right?”  That language suggests that the Eighth Circuit should merely strip analysis of prejudice from its existing test for waiver of the right to arbitrate, rather than applying the Circuit’s standard test for evaluating waiver in cases not involving arbitration agreements.

That instruction is not entirely consistent with Morgan’s instruction to adopt a general waiver analysis, as the remainder of the opinion suggests.  That is because the Eighth Circuit’s test for general waivers of contract rights differs from its test for waivers of the right to arbitrate—even when the latter is stripped of its prejudice requirement. 

The Court in Herrera then proceeded to explain that while the two tests in the Eight Circuit are fairly similar once prejudice is removed from the equation, “in the Second Circuit—which has not yet interpreted Morgan—there is a more significant (and, in some cases, possibly dispositive) difference between the two tests.”  As a result, the court proceeded to analyze the issue of arbitration waiver using both of the Second Circuit’s waiver tests.

In light of the ambiguity highlighted in Herrera, counsel litigating arbitration waiver should evaluate whether the general contractual waiver test in the jurisdiction where the dispute is pending differs from its arbitration-specific waiver test, particularly where application of the different tests might yield different results.  The issue will be most pronounced if the jurisdiction’s general implied waiver test contains a prejudice requirement, as discussed more fully in Part IV of Alto Litigation’s blog series on Morgan v. Sundance.  

*  *  *
Please contact Alto Litigation partners Bahram Seyedin-Noor (bahram@altolit.com) or Bryan Ketroser (bryan@altolit.com) if you require counseling on a securities litigation matter.

****

Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.


¹ Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 142 S.Ct. 1708, 1713 (2022)

² Id.

³ Id.

Id.

Herrera v. Manna 2nd Avenue LLC, 1:20-cv-11026-GHW, 2022 WL 2819072, at *7 (July 18, 2022) (internal citations omitted).

Morgan v. Sundance Part II: Limitations on the Federal Policy in Favor of Arbitration

In May 2022, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., where it held that under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), courts may not “condition a waiver of the right to arbitration on a showing of prejudice.”¹  Prior to Morgan, a majority of federal circuit courts had required a showing of prejudice before finding arbitration waiver.  According to the Supreme Court that was erroneous because the federal policy “favoring arbitration” does not permit courts to “invent special, arbitration preferring procedural rules.”² Rather, it simply requires courts to place arbitration agreements “on the same footing as other contracts.”³ Since “a federal court assessing waiver does not generally ask about prejudice,” the Court held it could not do so in the context of arbitration waiver either.⁴  

Morgan provides an important reminder regarding the limitations of the federal policy favoring arbitration.  According to the Court, that policy is “not about fostering arbitration,” it is about ensuring agreements to arbitrate are enforced just as any other contract would be.⁵  

“The policy,” we have explained, is merely an acknowledgment of the FAA’s commitment to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.  Or in another formulation: The policy is to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.  Accordingly, a court must hold a party to its arbitration contract just as the court would to any other kind.  But a court may not devise novel rules to favor arbitration over litigation.  If an ordinary procedural rule—whether of waiver or forfeiture or what-have-you—would counsel against enforcement of an arbitration contract, then so be it.⁶

While earlier Supreme Court cases like Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. had stated otherwise in dicta,⁷ Morgan put that broader theory to rest.   

As it stands, the policy in favor of arbitration applies to questions regarding the scope of an arbitration clause, such that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”⁸ However, courts have found that the policy in favor of arbitration does not apply in the following circumstances: 

  • Who Decides Arbitrability: questions regarding who decides threshold issues of arbitrability are presumptively for courts to decide unless the parties “clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise”;⁹

  • Note: Several courts have held that parties “clearly and unmistakably” agree to delegate arbitrability questions to an arbitrator by incorporating into their arbitration agreements institutional arbitration rules that empower an arbitrator to decide gateway arbitrability issues¹⁰

  • Formation of an Agreement to Arbitrate: “the presumption does not apply to disputes concerning whether an agreement to arbitrate has been made,” which is governed by state contract law;¹¹ and

  • Standing to Invoke an Agreement to Arbitrate: questions regarding who has standing to invoke an agreement to arbitrate are likewise governed by state contract law.¹²

And, of course, Morgan holds that the policy in favor of arbitration does not allow courts to create bespoke procedural rules favoring arbitration.¹³    

In sum, counsel litigating arbitrability issues must review pre-Morgan case law with a  careful eye to determine whether that precedent provides a reliable basis to invoke the federal policy in favor of arbitration. 

For further analysis, see Parts III–V of Alto Litigation’s Morgan v. Sundance blog series.

***

Please contact Alto Litigation partners Bahram Seyedin-Noor (bahram@altolit.com) or Bryan Ketroser (bryan@altolit.com) if you require counseling on a securities litigation matter.

****

Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.


¹ Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 142 S.Ct. 1708, 1713.

² Id.

³ Id.

Id.

Id.

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (“The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract . . . an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”) (emphasis added).

Id.

AT&T Tech’s, Inc. v. Comm’s Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).

¹⁰ See, e.g., T.Co Metals v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, 592 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2010).

¹¹ Dasher v. RBC Bank (USA), 745 F.3d 1111, 1116 (11th Cir. 2014); see also Romo v. Y-3 Holdings, Inc., 87 Cal. App. 4th 1153, 1158 (2001).

¹² See, e.g., Capua v. Air Europa Lineas Aereas S.A. Inc., No. 20-CV-61438-RAR, 2021 WL 965500, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2021).

¹³ Morgan, 142 S. Ct. at 1713.

Morgan v. Sundance and the New Arbitration Waiver Rule

Four Key Considerations

In May 2022, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., where it held that under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), courts may not “condition a waiver of the right to arbitration on a showing of prejudice.” Prior to Morgan, a majority of federal circuit courts had required a showing of prejudice before finding arbitration waiver. According to the Supreme Court that was erroneous because the federal policy “favoring arbitration” does not permit courts to “invent special, arbitration preferring procedural rules.” Rather, it simply requires courts to place arbitration agreements “on the same footing as other contracts.” Since “a federal court assessing waiver does not generally ask about prejudice,” the Court held it could not do so in the context of arbitration waiver either. 

Counsel litigating arbitrability issues in the wake of Morgan must be cognizant of at least the following issues: 

  1. Limited Policy Favoring Arbitration: Although the federal policy favoring arbitration is firmly entrenched, it does not mean that every issue of arbitrability requires putting a thumb on the scale in favor of arbitration – the presumption applies when assessing the scope of an agreement to arbitrate, but does not reach questions regarding contract formation, who has standing to invoke arbitration, who determines arbitrability, or procedural rules. 

  2. The Morgan Rule is Susceptible to Different Readings: Does Morgan require federal courts to excise prejudice from their current arbitration waiver standards, or does it require courts to simply apply their general contract waiver standards to the arbitration context? 

  3. State Implied Contract Waiver Rules Might Require A Different Result: If states apply a prejudice rule to the implied waiver of all contracts, should they continue to apply that rule in the wake of Morgan?  

  4. Outcomes May Not Be Affected: The cases decided since Morgan suggest that the new waiver rule may not change outcomes.  That is likely due to the fact that the litigation conduct that typically results in a finding of implied waiver is the same kind of conduct that often results in prejudice to the opposing party.  

These topics are treated in greater depth in Parts II–V of Alto Litigation’s forthcoming blog series on Morgan v. Sundance.

***

Please contact Alto Litigation partners Bahram Seyedin-Noor (bahram@altolit.com) or Bryan Ketroser (bryan@altolit.com) if you require counseling on a securities litigation matter.

****

Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.


[1] Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 142 S. Ct. 1708, 1713 (2022)

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

Alto Litigation Names Joshua Korr Partner-Elect

Alto Litigation, a San Francisco based litigation boutique specializing in securities, trade secret, and complex business litigation, is pleased to announce the firm has elected Joshua Korr as a new partner. The promotion will go into effect January 1, 2023. 

Joshua joined Alto Litigation in 2019. In his time with the firm, he has litigated complex cases connected to evolving technologies such as DNA sequencing, cryptocurrency, IoT, biometric sensors, ride-sharing, and artificial intelligence. He has found success in court and in arbitration through his ability to translate complex subjects into insightful, actionable litigation. 

“Josh’s incredible talent as an advocate was obvious to me from the first day that I met him back in 2011, when he was in the top of his class at Hastings Law School. Since joining us in 2019, Josh has been a force multiplier, helping us achieve one victory after another against much larger adversaries,” said Alto’s CEO, Bahram Seyedin-Noor. “We can’t wait to have him join our partnership in 2023.”

Prior to joining Alto Litigation, Joshua practiced at Morrison & Forrester in white-collar defense and securities litigation. He graduated summa cum laude from the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, and clerked at the Supreme Court of Hawai’i and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.


Alto Litigation, Attorneys Receive High-Ranking Distinctions from Benchmark Litigation

Benchmark Litigation, described as “the definitive guide to the market’s leading firms and lawyers,” has released its 2023 rankings widely recognizing the advocacy of Alto Litigation attorneys in multiple areas. 

Benchmark Litigation’s rigorous ranking process involves an analysis of law firms’ advocacy results, along with their review of feedback from law firm clients and peers. For 2023:

  • Alto Litigation was once again ranked as a Recommended Firm in California and a Tier 1 Firm in San Francisco in the area of Dispute Resolution. 

  • Alto Litigation was ranked in California in the area of Securities. 

  • Founding partner Bahram Seyedin-Noor was recognized in Securities and Commerical practice as a California and Local Litigation Star. 

  • Partner Bryan Ketroser was recognized in Securities as a California and Local Litigation Star.

Benchmark’s analysis noted that Alto Litigation “is a lean, robust San Francisco boutique representing industry titans throughout Silicon Valley, as well as in numerous jurisdictions nationwide. It is known for its trial-tested ability to dynamically punch well above its weight class against the nation’s largest top firms in several litigation niches, representing prominent companies and entrepreneurs in both defense and plaintiff roles.”

Benchmark’s full analysis of Alto Litigation can be found here.

About the Partners

Bahram, a Harvard Law School graduate, is well-regarded as a strategist in exceedingly difficult disputes. His record of arbitration awards, trial victories, dismissals, and successful confidential settlements results from his laser focus on clients’ business and litigation objectives from the outset. Over the last twenty-three years, Bahram has achieved dozens of victories in securities class actions, derivative lawsuits, arbitrations, and fiduciary duty disputes. Benchmark notes, “Seyedin-Noor is known for his methodical approach to complex securities and commercial maters, such as Securities and Exchange Commission investigations, derivative actions, trade secret matters, fiduciary disputes, and securities class actions.” Benchmark rankings are based both on case work and client interviews. According to one client quoted in the review, “Bahram is a brilliant attorney and excellent problem-solver. He is responsive, thorough, effective, and pragmatic – a rare combination.”

In 2021 and 2019, Benchmark Litigation named Bahram the “San Francisco Attorney of the Year” and nominated him for “California Securities Litigation Attorney of the Year” alongside only three other attorneys in the State. Chambers & Partners ranks Bahram among California’s top securities litigation practitioners. Among other accolades, The National Law Journal has named Bahram an “Elite Boutique Trailblazer,” and The Daily Journal recognized Alto Litigation firm as one of the Top Boutique firms in California. 

Bryan concentrates his practice on securities litigation, complex commercial litigation and SEC investigations. He represents technology companies, entrepreneurs, officers, directors, employees and shareholders in high-stakes matters in California, Delaware, and other courts throughout the US. Outside of court, Bryan regularly assists clients in achieving their goals through prelitigation counseling and aggressive representation in settlement negotiation. 

A graduate of Yale Law School, Bryan is a frequent speaker on the use of financial information in strategy, transactions and casework, and has been published in both Law360 and The Daily Journal.  Benchmark Litigation has recognized Bryan as a Litigation Star since 2021 and, before that, repeatedly included him in its “40 & Under Hot List.” Bryan also has been selected to Super Lawyers since 2020.


About Alto Litigation

Headquartered in San Francisco, Alto Litigation is a leader in representing technology companies, executives, entrepreneurs and investors in high-stakes litigation. The firm focuses on securities litigation (class actions, derivative, SEC, FINRA), intellectual property litigation (trade secrets, trademark, copyright) and other complex business disputes. Alto’s award-winning attorneys also provide pre-litigation counseling service and advise on internal investigations.


Second Circuit Revisits Elements of Scheme Liability in SEC v. Rio Tinto

Since the Second Circuit’s holding in Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161 (2005) (“Lentell”), it has been settled law in the Second Circuit that misstatements and omissions alone do not suffice to impose scheme liability on individuals who did not “make” alleged misstatements under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.  

Recently, in SEC v. Rio Tinto PLC, 41 F.4th 47, 49 (2022), the SEC asked the Second Circuit to consider whether Lentell should be abrogated in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Lorenzo v. SEC, 139 S. Ct. 1094 (2019) (“Lorenzo”). The SEC argued that Lorenzo had expanded the scope of the scheme subsections of Rule 10b-5a by ruling that an individual who disseminated a false statement (but did not make it) could be liable under the scheme subsections. Rio Tinto, 41 F.4th at 48-49, 52. For that reason, the SEC maintained that its scheme liability claims against Rio Tinto’s CEO and CFO should be allowed to proceed even though the only fact it had alleged to support their participation in a scheme was defendants’ “fail[ure] to prevent misleading statements from being disseminated by others.” Id. at 52. According to the SEC, “misstatements and omissions alone” should be enough to “form the basis for scheme liability,” so its pleading was more than sufficient. Id.   

The Second Circuit disagreed, finding that the SEC’s overly broad reading of Lorenzo would undermine two key features of Rule 10b-5(b).

  • First, the Supreme Court’s holding in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 142 (2011), limits primary liability under Rule 10b-5(b) to the “maker” of a statement. Rio Tinto, 41 F.4th at 52. An expanded scope of scheme liability like that proposed by the SEC would enable a plaintiff to prove that a defendant is primarily liable under the scheme subsections for mere “participation in the making of [] misstatements,” for example by helping to prepare them or, in this case, failing to prevent their dissemination. Id. 

  • Second, misstatements and omissions claims brought by private plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5(b) are subject to a heightened pleading standard. Rio Tinto, 4 F.4th at 52. This heightened standard does not apply to allegations of scheme liability because scheme liability does not require an allegation that the defendant made a statement. Id.

In addition, the Second Circuit found that Lorenzo did not abrogate Lentell because the two decisions are consistent with each other. Rio Tinto, 4 F.4th at 53. Though Lorenzo held that the “dissemination of false or misleading statements with intent to defraud” does come within the scheme subsections, the mere fact of the misstatements or omissions was not the sole basis for scheme liability in Lorenzo (as Lentell requires). Id. The defendant’s act of disseminating those misstatements constituted the “act” or “conduct” sufficient to invoke scheme liability. Id.

***

Please contact Alto Litigation partners Bahram Seyedin-Noor (bahram@altolit.com) or Bryan Ketroser (bryan@altolit.com) if you require counseling on a securities litigation matter.

****

Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.

The SEC Strikes At Crypto Assets In First of Its Kind Enforcement Action

bitcoin standing up on desk with other coins and chart in background

The Securities and Exchange Commission swatted the proverbial hornet’s nest in a first-of-its-kind insider trading action involving digital assets listed for trading on a major trading platform. While insider trading actions are common, the SEC made headlines by alleging for the first time that nine digital assets traded on Coinbase Global, Inc., one of the largest crypto asset trading platforms in the United States, satisfied the legal definition of “securities,” giving the SEC jurisdiction to bring charges under the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.

The SEC’s complaint filed on July 21 in the United States federal district court in Seattle alleged that Ishan Wahi, a manager in Coinbase’s assets and investing products group, repeatedly provided his brother Nikhil Wahi and a close friend, Sameer Ramani, with information about the timing and content of Coinbase’s announcements that the company would list cryptocurrency assets on its trading platform, in violation of Coinbase’s confidentially requirements.  Nikhil and Ramani allegedly made at least $1.1 million by trading ahead of the announcements.

According to the SEC, between at least June 2021 and June 2022, blockchain addresses linked to Nikhil and Wahi traded ahead of (sometimes by just minutes) more than ten announcements involving at least 25 crypto assets, nine of which were “crypto asset securities.”  The SEC’s complaint asserted that these digital assets satisfied the definition of investment contracts in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) because they were offered and sold to investors who made an investment of money in a common enterprise, with a reasonable expectation of profits derived from the efforts of others.  

More specifically, the SEC explained, each of the nine crypto asset securities were offered and sold by an issuer to raise money for the issuer’s business. The issuers and their promoters solicited investors by touting the potential for profits and the ability of investors to engage in secondary trading of their tokens, with the success of the investment depending on the efforts of management and others at the company. These representations were made through white papers, websites, social media, messaging systems and platforms such as Twitter, YouTube and Medium.[1] Thus, the SEC asserted that the nine crypto securities invited investment on the promise that managerial efforts and the availability of secondary trading would increase the value of the tokens, which were the “hallmarks” of a security.  

The SEC is seeking injunctions, civil monetary penalties, and disgorgement for violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. In a parallel action, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York brought criminal charges against the Wahi brothers and Ramani for wire fraud and wire fraud conspiracy, not insider trading. The Wahi brothers have pleaded not guilty to the charges, while Ramani is still at large.

The reaction to the SEC’s action was swift and scalding. Critics accused the SEC of pursuing “regulation by enforcement” rather than taking a regulatory approach. Coinbase stated that it does not list securities for trading and petitioned the SEC to propose new rules for the offer, sale, registration and trading of digital assets, including rules that would identify which assets are securities. Even Commissioner Caroline Pham of the Commodities and Futures Commission blasted the SEC and stated that the action could have broad implications beyond a single case, while underscoring the need for regulators to work together. The CFTC has asserted enforcement jurisdiction over fraudulent or manipulative activity in virtual digital currencies like Bitcoin and Ether, but has not asserted “registration jurisdiction.”

There are at least two potential roadblocks to future SEC actions. First, the outcome of court rulings, such as in the Wahi action and SEC v. Ripple Labs, Inc., where the SEC has alleged that the XRP digital asset should be registered as a security. Second, a bipartisan bill has been introduced in the Senate that would create a regulatory structure for digital assets, including a standard for determining which are commodities and which are securities.

In the meantime, digital asset companies and related exchanges face heightened risks. The SEC’s action demonstrates that the agency is prepared to bring enforcement actions based on the Division of Corporation Finance’s April 2019 “Framework for ‘Investment Contract’ Analysis of Digital Assets” that applied the Howey test to determine whether crypto assets are securities.  The SEC has beefed up hiring for the newly created Crypto Assets and Cyber Unit, while SEC Chair Gary Gensler stated that when digital assets function as securities they will be treated as such.  

***

Please contact Alto Litigation partners Bahram Seyedin-Noor (bahram@altolit.com) or Bryan Ketroser (bryan@altolit.com) if you require counseling on a securities litigation matter.

****

Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.


[1] The SEC cast a skeptical eye on white papers by observing that they often used “pseudo-technical jargon”.

Can Plaintiffs Avoid Discovery Sequencing When Bringing a Trade Secret Claim in California District Court?

Every trade secret plaintiff in California state court knows they will have to wage battle over whether they have identified their alleged trade secrets with reasonable particularity before discovery “relating to the trade secret” may commence. [1] What if a plaintiff could evade this albatross by filing (when procedurally appropriate) in federal court?  

The recent holding in Skye Orthobiologics, LLC, et al. v. CTM Biomedical, LLC, et al. (“Skye Orthobiologics”), No. 20-cv-03444-DMG-PVCX, 2021 WL 6102432 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2021), suggests there may be that possibility.

While the Ninth Circuit has yet to squarely decide whether Section 2019.210 applies to federal actions asserting a claim under the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“CUTSA”), district court decisions have generally come out one of three ways:

(1) those holding that the discovery restriction does not conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is fully applicable, an approach “routinely” taken by courts in the Northern District of California (e.g., Openwave Messaging, Inc. v. Open-Xchange, Inc., No. 16-cv-00253-WHO, 2018 WL 2117424, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2018) (collecting cases));

(2) those holding that the restriction conflicts with Rule 26 of the Federal Rules and is not applicable (e.g.,Hilderman v. Enea TekSci, Inc., No. 5-cv-01049-BTM-AJB, 2010 WL 143440, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2010)); and

3) those holding that a federal court may use the Federal Rules to fashion appropriate protections in a particular case, which may be similar to the California restrictions in order to advance the same objectives served by the California statute (e.g., Jardin v. DATAllegro, Inc., No. 10-cv-2552-IEG-WVG, 2011 WL 3299395, at *3-5 (S.D. Cal. July 29, 2011)).

Conversion Logic, Inc. v. Measured, Inc., No. 19-cv-05546-ODW-FFMX, 2020 WL 2046391, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2020). These cases, however, did not examine the scenario of how the court should approach discovery sequencing when the plaintiff brings its trade secret claim under the Defense of Trade Secret Act (“DTSA”), a federal statute, but does not bring a CUTSA claim.

This scenario was recently considered in Skye Orthobiologics. In Skye Orthobiologics, plaintiff asserted a DTSA claim only – and no CUTSA claim. See Skye Orthobiologics, 2021 WL 6102432 at *8.  Unlike CUTSA, DTSA does not require a plaintiff to identify its trade secrets before any other party must respond to discovery.  Id. at *6-7. Therefore, the Sky Orthobiologics court reasoned that the “‘absence of . . . a discovery [sequencing] procedure in DTSA . . . support[s] the inference that a plaintiff . . . is entitled to discovery in accordance with the general discovery rules set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.’”  Id. at *7. While recognizing the broad discretion afforded to district courts to craft discovery orders that “set the timing and sequence of discovery,” the court found no “case-specific considerations” that would a more detailed disclosure of plaintiff’s alleged trade secrets than was set forth in the complaint.  Id. at *8. Hence, the court ruled that each side could “proceed with discovery simultaneously, and expeditiously.”  Id.

 Based on our own very informal survey of filings in California District Courts over the last six months, we found approximately twice as many plaintiffs asserted DTSA and CUTSA claims as opposed to DTSA claims only. It will be interesting to see whether, and how widely, district courts adopt this reasoning when faced with the less common scenario of a plaintiff asserting a DTSA claim with no accompanying CUTSA claim. Until then, decisions in other jurisdictions** suggest a growing trend of courts from around the country to require a trade secret plaintiff to identify its trade secrets with “reasonable particularity” before it may commence discovery relating to those trade secrets. 

***

Please contact Alto Litigation partners Bahram Seyedin-Noor (bahram@altolit.com) or Bryan Ketroser (bryan@altolit.com) if you require counseling on a trade secret litigation matter.

****

Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.


**See Vesta Corp. v. Amdocs Management Ltd., 147 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1152 (D. Or. 2015) (citing Engelhard Corp. v. Savin Corp., 505 A.2d 30, 33 (Del. Ch. 1986), Xerox Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 371–72 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); DeRubeis v. Witten Technologies, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 676, 680–81 (N.D. Ga. 2007); Automed Techs., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 926 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Dura Global Technologies, Inc. v. Magna Donnelly, Corp., No. 7-cv-10945, 2007 WL 4303294, at *2 (E.D. Mich. 2007); Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (S.D. Fla. 2001); and Ikon Office Solutions v. Konica Minolta Business Solutions, No. 8-cv-0539-RLV-DCK, 2009 WL 4429156, at *4–5 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 25, 2009) and noting “[t]his list is not exhaustive.”).


[1] For an analysis of how California courts determine what constitutes “discovery relating to the trade secret,” in the context of California Code of Civil Procedure section 2019.210 (“Section 2019.210”) see our prior article.

The DTSA and Disgorgement: A Look at the “Avoided Costs” Theory of Damages

Can trade secret damages actually exceed the value of the stolen technology to the infringer? Yes, according to the “avoided costs” theory of damages, which is currently on appeal in the Second Circuit.

 Damages in trade secrets cases can be notoriously difficult to quantify. This is particularly true where the plaintiff has suffered no direct harm in the form of lost profits. But federal courts have increasingly endorsed the “avoided costs” damages remedy, which may arguably leave a plaintiff with substantial damages and in a better position than had the misappropriation never occurred.   

 A form of unjust enrichment, the “avoided costs” theory seeks to recover “the wrongful gain to the party that misappropriated the trade secret.” Syntel Sterling Best Shores Mauritius Ltd. v. TriZetto Grp., Inc., No. 15 CIV. 211 (LGS), 2021 WL 1553926, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2021). This “wrongful gain” may be quantified as the research and development funds saved by the defendant, which the plaintiff may recover in full.  Id. at *6-7. Notably, a plaintiff may use its own research and development costs as a proxy for what the defendant “saved” by virtue of the misappropriation.  Id. at *7. In effect, this may allow the harmed party to recover all research and development costs associated with the misappropriated technology. This outcome may arguably leave the plaintiff better off than had the misappropriation never occurred:  the plaintiff may continue to reap the benefits of its own technology while having its research costs subsidized by the infringer. Nonetheless, the “avoided costs” remedy has been endorsed as a proper measure of damages in a trade secrets case. Id.

Syntel Sterling offers a choice example. In that case, TriZetto accused Syntel of misappropriating trade secrets under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DSTA”).  Id. at *1. The trade secrets included software tools aimed at improving complex installation, upgrading, and customization processes relating to the autonomous management of health insurance claims. Id. After establishing liability, TriZetto sought damages, the amount that Syntal saved in development costs, using TriZetto’s own development costs as a proxy. Id. at *7.  In doing so, TriZetto argued that Syntal benefited from the misappropriation with “early entry” into complex consulting market without having had to develop the necessary technology required for such services. Id. at *8. At trial, TriZetto sought more than $284 million in “avoided cost” damages, which the jury awarded in full. Id. at *1.  

Post-trial, Syntal moved for a judgment as a matter of law on all claims. Id. *1. In seeking to undo the damages award, Syntal first argued that TriZetto should not receive the total value of a trade secret when TriZetto still received value from the trade secrets. Id. at *7. In other words, the total “avoided damages” award overcompensated TriZetto, who was still making money from the misappropriated technology. See id. In rejecting this argument, the district court held that the DTSA expressly permits the recovery of unjust enrichment damages, which should not logically depend on the “continuing value of the trade secret to the claimant,” and “do not require a corresponding loss to the plaintiff[.]”. Id. It rather was aimed at disgorging a wrongdoer from ill-gotten gains.  Id.  

Syntel next argued that “avoided costs” should not be awarded when the claimant’s “actual loss” (in the form of lost profits) and Syntal’s “actual enrichment” (in the form of increased revenues) could easily be measured. Id. But the court rejected these arguments as well. Id. In rejecting the “actual loss” argument, the court held that the DTSA expressly allows recovery of both actual loss and unjust enrichment, so long as there is no double counting. Id. In rejecting the “actual enrichment” argument, the court acknowledged that measuring actual enrichment to Syntel may be one way to measure unjust enrichment damages, but awarding “avoided costs” may be a more appropriate measure of damages where the infringer (Syntel) enjoyed only modest profit or even no profit. Id. The wrongdoer, not the aggrieved party, should bear the business risk that the wrongful use of the secrets will not be profitable. Id.    

Syntel Sterling is currently pending on appeal before the Second Circuit. It remains to be seen whether TriZetto’s damages theory will be upheld. But if upheld, the Second Circuit will affirm the nature of the “avoided cost” remedy, allowing a claimant to recover its entire research and development costs associated with the misappropriated technology. This is true even if the claimant itself retains profitable use of the trade secrets; the claimant otherwise suffered only modest (but measurable) direct financial harm, and the defendant itself benefited little from the misappropriation.

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Please contact Alto Litigation partners Bryan Ketroser (bryan@altolit.com) or Bahram Seyedin-Noor (bahram@altolit.com) if you require counseling on a trade secret litigation matter.

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Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.

Section 2019.210 and the Need for Better Boundaries That Define “Discovery Relating to the Trade Secret”

Trade secret litigants in California are well versed in the general requirements of Code of Civil Procedure Section 2019.210, as it imposes a unique sequencing to the order of discovery. In a non-trade secrets case, the plaintiff may (with few exceptions) commence discovery 10 days after service of the summons and complaint while the defendant can serve discovery at any time. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.020, 2031.020, 2033.020. In a trade secret case, however, this general rule does not apply. The Section provides (with emphasis added):  

“In any action alleging the misappropriation of a trade secret under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act . . . , before commencing discovery relating to the trade secret, the party alleging the misappropriation shall identify the trade secret with reasonable particularity . . . .”

While California courts have provided substantial guidance on what it means to identify a trade secret with “reasonable particularity,”[1] few published decisions have addressed the issue of what constitutes “discovery relating to the trade secret.” Does it mean discovery related solely to the trade secret cause of action? Does it mean discovery related solely to those trade secrets that the Court first determines have been identified with reasonable particularity? Does Section 2019.210 “discovery relating to the trade secret” extend to other causes of action – including breach of contract – that might “relate to” the trade secret claim? And what if the same body of discovery that “relat[es] to the trade secret” also relates to the defendant’s cross-claims or one or more non-trade secret causes of action asserted by the plaintiff? While the letter of the law is not crystal clear, the Court’s holding in Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 132 Cal. App. 4th 826 (2005) (“Advanced Modular”) provides some critical guidance.

Advanced Modular

In a case of first impression, the Court in Advanced Modular considered whether the reach of Section 2019.210 extended beyond the asserted trade secret claim to prohibit discovery on “any cause of action that relates to the trade secret.”

In Advanced Modular, the plaintiff argued that it should have been permitted to commence discovery on its nine non-trade secret causes of action – which included contract, tort and equitable claims – before identifying its trade secrets with particularity. Id. at 834-35. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument because it ruled a “fair reading” of the complaint “compels the conclusion that each and every cause of action hinges upon the factual allegation that [defendant] misappropriated [plaintiff’s] trade secrets.” Id. at 834 (emphasis added). For example, the only alleged basis for the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim was that the defendants had breached their confidentiality agreements by “disclosing the trade secrets.” Id. The contract claim alleges no other breach. Id. Similarly, every other cause of action “incorporate[d] and depend[ed] upon the foundational allegation that petitioners ha[d] misappropriated . . . trade secrets.” Id. at 831; see also id. at 834. Based on its express finding that every cause of action was “factually dependent on the misappropriation allegation,” the court ruled that discovery could commence only after the allegedly misappropriated trade secrets had been identified with reasonable particularity. Id. at 834-35 (emphasis added).

Thus, Advanced Modular stands for the proposition that a cause of action must “hinge[] upon” or be “factually dependent on” the trade secret allegation in order for the Section 2019.210 discovery stay to extend to that cause of action. That guidance, however, does not go far enough. In fact, in Advanced Modular the Court readily recognized the limited reach of its holding, noting: “[w]hile we can envision an ‘action’ alleging misappropriation in some causes of action but not in others, the instant ‘action’ is not one of them.”  Id. at 834. California appellate courts have yet to consider three related issues: (1) whether and to what extent discovery should proceed when one or more of the causes of action do not “hinge upon” or “factually depend on” the trade secret claims; (2) whether the plaintiff may proceed with discovery as to the trade secrets that it has adequately disclosed; and (3) to what extent a plaintiff may obtain discovery that relates both to an alleged trade secret (that has yet to be identified with particularity) and another cause of action or defense. Though not controlling, several federal district courts have considered these issues with differing results.

District Court Cases Interpreting Scope of Discovery “Relating to” the Trade Secret

The court in Loop AI Labs Inc. v. Gatti, No. 15-cv-00798-HSG (DMR), 2015 WL 9269758, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2015) considered – and denied – the defendant’s motion to stay all discovery in the case until plaintiff complied with Section 2019.210. The court reasoned that “Section 2019.210 only supports a stay of ‘discovery relating to the trade secret[s].’”  Id. at *4. Since only one of the plaintiff’s seventeen claims (a CUTSA claim) alleged misappropriation of trade secrets, the plaintiff was allowed to proceed with discovery on its remaining claims, which included claims for fraud, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, tortious interference, unfair competition, unjust enrichment, and conversion. Id. 

Although the plaintiff had not identified all of its purported trade secrets with particularity, the court in Quintara Biosciences, Inc. v. Ruifeng Biztech Inc., No. cv-20-04808 WHA, 2021 WL 965349, at *4 (N.D. Cal. March 13, 2021), allowed the plaintiff to proceed with discovery relating to the several trade secrets it had adequately disclosed. Notably, the Ninth Circuit suggested that once a trade secret has been defined with some particularity, “discovery provides an iterative process where requests between parties lead to a refined and sufficiently particularized trade secret identification.” InteliClear, LLC v. ETC Global Holdings, Inc., 978 F.3d 653, 662 (2020).

In M/A-COM Technology Solutions, Inc. v. Litrinium, Inc., No. 19-cv-00220-JVS (JDEx), 2019 WL 428523 at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2019), the Court considered whether the plaintiff should be permitted to proceed with the discovery that bears upon issues of both trade secret and non-trade secret issues before it had made satisfactory Section 2019.210 disclosures. The court refused the plaintiff's request, reasoning that Section 2019.210 “does not limit discovery ‘exclusively’ relating to the trade secrets.” In the M/A-COM court’s view, a “request that relates to both trade secret and other issues still ‘relates to’ the trade secret.”  Id. at *5. Because the court concluded that all of the discovery requests in issue “relate[d] to” the trade secrets, the defendant did not have to respond to any of the requests until the plaintiff complied with Section 2019.210.  

Finally, in Masimo Corp. v. Apple Inc., No. 18-cv-20-48 JVS (JDEx), 2020 WL 5215308 at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2020), the District Court considered whether the discovery magistrate erred in ordering the defendant to respond to dual-purpose discovery with both patent and trade secret aspects when the Scheduling Order had stayed “trade secret discovery only pending compliance with [Section] 2019.210.”  See also Masimo Corp. v. Apple Inc., No. 18-cv-20-48 JVS (JDEx), 2020 WL 5223558 at *1. Defendant Apple argued that allowing Plaintiff to take discovery “merely by claiming that [it] relates to another claim, like [] patent infringement” effectively eviscerates the requirements of Section 2019.210.  Id. at 2. The court rejected Apple’s argument finding instead that the court was well within its rights to allow patent discovery to proceed before the plaintiff had fully complied with Section 2019.210 because “plaintiffs’ patent claims are separate from the trade secret claims.”  Id. at 3.  See also Philips North America LLC v. Advanced Imaging Services, No. 2:21-cv-00876 JAM AC at * 7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) (allowing certain discovery to proceed where it was “independent of plaintiff’s trade secret claims”).

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Given the frequency with which this issue arises in any trade secret case, practitioners should expect further guidance from both state and federal district courts.  

Please contact Alto Litigation partners Bryan Ketroser (bryan@altolit.com) or Bahram Seyedin-Noor (bahram@altolit.com) if you require counseling on a trade secret litigation matter.

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Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.


[1] See e.g., Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc. v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. App. 4th 826, 835-36 (2005); Alta Devices, Inc. v. LG Electronics., Inc., No. 18-cv-00404-LHK-VKD, 2019 WL 176261, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2019).